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Abstract 
Shafer's theory of belief and the Bayesian theory of probability are two alternative 
and mutually inconsistent approaches toward modelling uncertainty in artificial in­
telligence. To help reduce the conflict between these two approaches, this paper 
reexammes expected utility theory - from which Bayesian probability theory is 
derived. 
Expected utility theory req mres the decision maker to ass1gn a utility to each 
decision conditioned on every possible event that might occur. But frequently the 
decision maker cannot foresee all the events that might occur, i.e., one of the possible 
events is the occurrence of an unforeseen event. So once we acknowledge the existence 
of unforeseen events, we need to develop some way of assigning utilities to tlecisions 
conditioned on unforeseen events. 
The commonsensical solution to this problem is to assign similar utilities to events 
which are similar. Implementing this commonsensical solution is equivalent to replac­
ing Bayesian subjective probabilities over the space of foreseen and unforeseen events 
by random set theory probabilities over the space of foreseen events. This leads to 
an expected utility principle in which normalized variants of Shafer's commonalities 
play the role of subjective probabilities. 
lienee allowing for unforeseen events in decision analysis causes Bayesian proba-
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bility theory to become much more similar to Shaferian theory. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Evaluating the desirability of different decisions d under uncertainty requires that 
the decision maker 
1. list every eventuality, E E F, that he foresees as possible occurrences 
2. add Fe to this list if something unforeseen might occur. (As Fischhoff, Slovic 
& Lichtenstein(1978) note, many real problems involve events the decision 
maker did not foresee. ) 
3. assign each event E a probability Pr(E) (with 'EEEF Pr(E) + Pr(Fe) = 1) 
4. assess the utility of each decision given each foreseen event, u( d iE) 
5. assess the utility of each decision given the unforeseen event Fe. 
Expected utility theory then mandates choosing decision d over d* if 
L Pr(E)u(d i E) � L Pr(E)u(d* I E) 
EEFvFc EEFvFc 
It is common to implement step 5 by assuming 
ASSUMPTION 0: For some u0, u(d iFe) = u0 for all d. 
(1) 
Given this assumption, the expected utility criterion in (1) remains valid with Pr(E) 
replaced by Pr(E I F) , enabling the decision maker to skip steps (2) and (5). 
Unfortunately Assumption 0 is often inadequate. Thus frequently the utility of 
decision d given each atomic event E can be thought of as some well-defined function 
of m characteristics of event E. (See Keeney & Raiffa(1976) for further discussion 
of such multiattribute utility functions.) Now suppose an unforeseen event event IE 
occurs which 
• is identica� to event E on almost all of these key m characteristics 
• is quite different from any event other than E on these m characteristics 
Then the utility of decision d given IE is likely to be much closer to the utility of 
decision d given E, than it is to the utility of decision d given any event other than 
E. This violates Assumption 0. 
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The next section formalizes this notion of similarity between events and develops 
a revised version of Assumption 0. This revision of Assumption 0 is equivalent to 
replacing subjective probabilit;y theory over the full space of events F V Fe with nor­
malized commonalities over the space of foreseen events F. Since common ali ties are 
an alternate way of formulating the theory of lower probabilities( Good( 1962) , Koop­
man(1940), Shafer{1976)), this result suggests a new connection between subjective 
probability theory, random set theory(Goodman & Nguyen{1985), Kendal1(19711)) 
and lower probabilities. 
2 MAPPING EVENTS INTO THE POWER SET OF F 
2.1 Defining Characteristics for Atomic & Compound Events 
Suppose the utility of a decision given an atomic event E is completely determined by 
the event's characteristics, Ck(E), k = 1, . .. , m. Hence if E and E* have precisely the 
same set of characteristics (i.e., Ck(E) = Ck(E*),k = l. . . m) , then u(diE) = u(diB*) 
for any d E D. We define the range of each characteristic as the set of all values 
it assumes for the various foreseen events. Suppose we then fix all characteristics 
but characteristic j at some reference level (e.g., their value at the status quo.) We 
define the importance of j as how much u( diE) can vary as we vary characteristic 
j over its range and vary d E D. We then renumber the characteristics1 in order of 
decreasing importance. 
Consider a compound event, A, formed from the unwn of atomic events in F 
and suppose that all atomic events in .11 have the same first r characteristics ( i.e., 
they agree on the r most important characteristics) but not the same :first r + 1 
characteristics, i.e. Ck(E) = Ck(E*), E, E* E .!l, lc = l...r but Cr+t(E) =/= Cr+l(E*) 
for some E, E* E A. We refer to these first r characteristics as compound event A's 
ch a.racteristi cs. 
1 Note that the analyst could redefine his partition in terms of all possible occurrence of dif­
ferent m-tuples of characteristics. Since there are no unforeseen events in this partition, applying 
probability theory is straightforward. llut since utilities have not been defined over all possible 
occurrences of various m-tuples of characteristics, further assumptions are needed to specify the 
utilities form-tuples associated with unforeseen events. This need to specify utilities for unforeseen 
events leads to the approach used in this paper. 
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Suppose an unforeseen event i occurs. \Ve now relabel event i as follows: 
An Algorithm for Labelling Unforeseen Events 
1. Identify how event i ra.tes on each of the m key characteristics. 
2. Let r = m. 
3. Determine whether there are any compound or atomic events which have 
the same first r characteristics as the unforeseen event. 
4. Let P be the union of all such events. If P is nonempty, then label the 
unforeseen event as lp. 
5. If P is empty and r > 1 then let r = 1' - 1 and return to step 3. 
6. if P is empty and r = 1, then label the unforeseen event as /0. 
2.2 Mapping F V Fe into the power set of F 
This algorithm maps all unforeseen events into the power set of F. Thus suppose 
our space of foreseen events consists of the three events 
(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0), (0, o, 1) 
where ( 1, 1, 0) indicates that event (1, 1, 0) has a. value of 1 for its most important 
characteristic, a value of 1 for its second most important characteristic and a value of 
0 for its least important characteristic. Then if an unforeseen event (1, O, 0) occurs, 
our algorithm would relabel it as J(I,l,l)v(l,l,o)· 
We now similarly reclassify all atomic events. Let A( C1 ••• Cm) be the union of 
all atomic events which have the same m characteristics, C1, ... Cm. We relabel this 
event as JA(c1 ... Cm)· If an atomic event E's characteristics are unique, then we relabel 
it as IE. 
lienee we have mapped the set of foreseen and unforeseen events, F V pc, into the 
power set of F. 
3 EXPECTED UTILITY WITII NORMALIZED 
COMMONALITIES 
Consistent with Assumption 0, we assume that u( dl/0) = u0, d E D, i.e., if an 
unforeseen event bearing no resemblance to any foreseen event occurs, then its utility 
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is the same given all decisions. Since this makes the occurrence of J0 irrelevant in 
determining the utility maximizing decision, we define new probabilities conditioned 
on its non-occurrence: 
Then LACF mA = 1 so that m satisfies the same formal properties as Shafer's ba.sic 
probability assignments. Equation(l)'s condition for preferring d to d* becomes 
L mAu(dllA) > I: mAu(d*IIA) (2) 
A�F A�F 
But equation (2) cannot be used to infer the optimal decision until utilities are 
assigned to d, d* conditioned on IA. 
Suppose that dedsion d gives the same utility for all events which are subsets of 
some compound event A. This might occur if, for example, decision d's utility only 
depended on the characteristics which all events in A had in common2• If this were 
true, then we would use this utility to estinude the utility of decision d given IA, i.e., 
we would assume 
ASSUMPTION 1 :  u(d!IA) = u(diE),E E A IF u(diE) = u(diE*),E,E* E A 
Now suppose that different events in A assign different utilities to decision d, i.e., 
the characteristics that all events in A share in common only partially determine a 
decision's utility given those events. If we randomly picked an event in A, our best 
estimate of its utility for decision d would be the average of the utilities which each 
event in A assigns to d. vVe now propose to use this mean estimate to estimate a 
decision's utility given IA, i . e., we generalize assumption3 1 to 
LE A u(diE) ASSUMPTION 2: u(diiA) = -�i�Ir--
where !AI is the number of atomic events in A. Given this assumption, equation (2) 
becomes 
E cN(E)u(diE) � E cN(E)u(d*IE) 
E E 
2There are, of course, obvious counterexamples to this presupposition. N onethelcss it is not au 
unreasonable rule of thumb. 
3 As the Appendix notes, one can construct alternatives to Assumption 2 which lead to much 
deeper linkages between subjective probablJities and lower probabilities. 
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where 
cN(E) = L m_(i�l A-;2E IA I 
are normalized commonalities (unlike Shafer's commonalities:C(E) = l:A;2E m(A)). 
Thus our analysis of unforeseen events leads us to replace additive subjective prob­
abilities by normalized commonalities. 
Hence Bayesian theory, applied to a space of foreseen and unforeseen events, leads 
to expected utility theory with normalized commonalities replacing probabilities. If 
E1 ... Em are the atoms of the space of foreseen events, then Lk=l CN(E�c) = 1. But 
since cN(El v E2) s cN(Et), eN is subadditive for other partitions of the event 
space. To get an additive measure, we define 
1. Pr(E) = CN(E) for E an atom of the space 
2. Pr(B) = EEEB Pr(E) for B a union of several atoms 
If we let jA&Bj be the number of atoms common to both A and B, then 
Thus 
IA&HI Pr(B) = L ---m(A) 
A IA I 
L rn(A) S Pr(B) S L m(A) 
A�B AnB�0 
i.e., our probability function is bounded by Shafer's upper and lower probabilities. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Most decision analyses ignore unforeseen events. But unforeseen events can cause a 
rational decisionmaker to refuse to bet on either A or its complement, F-A, because 
of his concerns about the consequences of betting4 given the unforeseen event, pc. 
Hence Dutch book-related argumcnts(DeFinetti,1970; Lindley,1982) are inapplicable 
when unforeseen events are possible. This does not, of course, refute the Bayesian 
paradigm; what it does do is refute Assump!:lon 0 which had made unforeseen events 
irrelevant in computing expected utilHy. 
----------- - -
4Bordley & llazen(1991) present many examples of a suspicious decision maker who, presented 
with a lottery that seems too good to be true, instindively feels there must be a 'catch' somewhere. 
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Since Assumption 0 is refuted, an alternative way of assigning utilities to unfore­
seen events is necessary. This paper assumes tha.t a decision's utility given some 
unforeseen event equals that decision's utility given similar foreseen events. We also 
specify an algorithm for classifying which set of foreseen events is 'similar' to each of 
the various unforeseen events. 
Our procedure is equivalent to replacing subjective probabilities defined over the 
space of foreseen and unforeseen events by random set theory probabilities over 
the space of foreseen events. The subjective probabilities appearing in the stan­
dard expected utility theory formula are now replaced by normalized commonali­
ties. So while others have viewed lower probabilities as a promising extension of 
Bayesian analysis(Gaines,1984; Good,1962; Smith, 1961; Williams, 1978; Dubois & 
Prade,1985), this paper5 indicates that a certain variant of lower probability theory 
is implicit in Bayesian analysis given the appropriate assumptions on how unforeseen 
events are treated. 
One could interpret our analysis as saying that a Bayesian decision theorist, con­
scious of the possibility of unforeseen events, w.ill inflate his assessed probability for 
an event E occurring so as to account for the occurrence of unforeseen events with 
consequences similar to event E. Since many psychological explanations of apparent 
irrationality in human decision making presume that individuals adjust probabil­
ities(Hogarth & Einhorn,1990), the existence of unforeseen events may provide a 
partial explanation of such behavioral anomalies. 
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